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Determining knowledge happens by indexically attuned 
justification. One may also say that knowledge comes 
without justification if standards for knowledge are 
measured by fancy requirements. A lower setting of scores 
brings justification back. Epistemic responsibility requires 
attuning to context. Structures of epistemic justification are 
extended from these resting on exceptionless general 
rules to the ones involving generalities with exceptions and 
further to those proceeding from particular contextual 
cases. How can justification in the context really work? 
Discussion involves the last two manners of how to 
systematize the structure of justification. The first of these 
involves general patterns and thus normative authority of 
the general and the second builds on particular contexts. 
The structure of justification proposed by this last one 
complies with accommodation requirements for a realistic 
account of knowledge. 
1. Justification in context – how does it 
happen? 
I did not know about the departure time of the bus in 
direction of town. So I phoned the bus company. They told 
me about the schedule and I immediately knew, so I was 
able to plan my trip. I took the relevant pieces of back-
ground knowledge and brought them together. It was 
important for me that bus at this particular time departs to 
this particular town. I only have guessed about the 
information before, but as I asked and as I received 
response I knew. So I skipped further verification. It would 
have taken me too much time anyway to check everything 
that could perhaps go wrong if I wished not to be too late 
for my bus. Counterfactual possibilities exercise a big 
pressure. Indexical elements have a stronger overall pull 
towards conditions that secure knowledge than do the 
non-indexical elements coming in a generalized form. 
The usual story involving conditions guaranteeing 
knowledge has it the other way round in respect to the 
already explained experience and intuitions. General 
possibilities dealing with defeaters and counterexamples 
are considered as providing conditions for knowledge, for 
their function is to insure against fallibility. The resulting 
pressure for determining all possible conditions of justifi-
cation screens off the importance of indexical presuppo-
sitions. 
Indexical elements come with the context. Indexicality 
also creates context. Justification for beliefs does not come 
in one single form. The relevance of a feature contributing 
to justificatory conditions of knowledge varies from one 
context to another.  
Maybe there are several forms of justification. If this is 
the case, then whatever is called “knowledge without 
justification” may still be justified, but just in another, 
perhaps in a weaker sense. Justification may come in 
several forms of compactness pertaining to the landscape 
inhabiting forces that secure knowledge. Justification may 
have its background consistency stressed or relieved; it 
may come with high, with middle or with low requirements 
put on the structure of the shape supporting it. 
Fancy forms of knowledge won the day at the time 
Socrates was walking around the town, demonstrating to 
each person how despite this person’s beliefs about 
possessing knowledge the person in question did not 
actually know. Another fancy form of knowledge figures 
court decisions. One would feel rather uneasy about 
accepting something based merely on probable opinion as 
an outcome of a fair trial.  
As scores for most situations of knowledge are set too 
high, it is then natural that most of the usual cases figuring 
knowledge will fail to pass the test. We may say that there 
will be no justification for these cases, and so they will be 
cases of knowledge without justification. Myself learning 
and then knowing when the bus will depart is perhaps a 
case of knowledge. High-grade excessive justification 
requirements come with abstraction from context. Abstrac-
tion from a particular context is linked to stretching justi-
ficatory structure over a multitude of contexts reaching out 
of the range of the unique indexed context in which the 
agent finds himself. 
There is another understanding of what knowledge 
without justification may be about. According to this, there 
are basic beliefs, so one presupposes something in the 
situation, without the need to account for it. Candidates for 
such unjustified beliefs would then be supported by 
presuppositions in the situation. One builds one’s authority 
on what is given in the context. 
Instead of fancy excessive requirements for justification 
some other structure is needed, and this is provided by 
epistemic responsibility. Being epistemically responsible 
does not mean that one has to check for all the ways in 
which the goal of knowledge can fail. Many times this 
would be a rather irresponsible manner of acting. It is 
responsible to act in a way that is appropriate to the 
situation at hand, and to check all the relevant defeaters in 
this situation.  
“Broadly speaking, being epistemically responsible has 
to do with such activities as: (1) gathering evidence, (2) 
considering and dealing with counterpossibilities, and (3) 
dealing with internal conflicts of belief.” (Timmons 1999, 
195) 
Here are three possible readings of the first two items 
proposed by the quote. 
(1)  (a)  gathering all possible evidence 
(b)  gathering some evidence 
(c)  gathering just this contextually attuned evidence 
(2)  (a)  Considering and dealing with all possible coun-
terpossibilities 
(b)  Considering and dealing with some counterpos-
sibilities 
(c) Considering just these contextually attuned 
counterpossibilities 
Three emerging structures of justification bases may be 
more systematically characterized in the following way, 
corresponding to possible readings of epistemic responsi-
bility requirements: 
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(a) Deductive-like pattern of justification ranges over all 
single cases, and it considers all possible counterexam-
ples or defeaters (for a belief to be justified knowledge). 
(b) Inductive-like pattern ranges over most of the single 
cases, and it considers most of the possible counterex-
amples or defeaters (for a belief to be justified knowl-
edge). 
(c) Particularist pattern does not involve any projection 
from one single case to another one; the considered 
relevant counterexamples or defeaters all reside in the 
unique context, and are indistinguishable from this 
context. Once you see the context, you see them all. If 
you do not see some, they make part of another context.  
The mistake of (a) and (b) is to suppose that relevance of 
the justificatory structure may be obtained in such a 
manner that it includes counterexamples or defeaters 
extending over general pattern which ranges through a 
multitude of contexts, somehow besides to the actual 
context. The basic distinction is between the particular 
contexts with their unique patterns, including defeaters as 
dynamical forces shaping them, and between generalist 
strategies, either without or with exceptions. The difference 
is thus between c) on the one hand, and between (a) and 
(b) coming together on the other hand. There is thus no 
such basic distinction between this general pattern ranging 
over all or over most of the cases involving defeaters, 
although this kind of distinction, introduced by (b) may 
seem basic at first sight, and it is indeed a qualitative jump 
from the position presupposed by (a). Justification includes 
relevance in the context, so it embraces the possibility (c). 
This last position is qualitatively different from the former 
two positions in that it considers the pattern in one 
particular context providing the justificatory structure, as 
against the former two which propose patterns extending 
over several possible contexts as providing the justificatory 
structure. 
The three mentioned possibilities of justificatory struc-
ture (a), (b), c) may be presented according to the 
parameters that shape justificatory landscape: 
 (a) (b) (c) 
i.  
Rules  
General 
rules without 
exceptions 
(deduction-
like) 
General 
rules with 
exceptions 
(ceteris pari-
bus, induct-
ion-like) 
Particular 
contexts: no 
rules, just 
indexical 
relevance 
ii. 
Defeaters 
Rules 
determine 
knowledge 
as the result 
of beating all 
possible 
defeaters 
Rules 
determine 
knowledge 
as consid-
ering most of 
possible 
defeaters 
Knowledge is 
the result of 
justification 
coming from 
particular pat-
terns, defeat-
ers are in a 
particular 
context 
iii. 
Projectibility 
Projectibility 
extends over 
all contexts 
Projectibility 
extends over 
most 
contexts 
There is no 
projectibility: 
the structure  
of justification, 
including 
defeaters, 
resides in the 
shape of each 
particular 
context 
The involved rules (i), the considered defeaters (ii) and 
projectibility or its absence (iii) shape the structural basis of 
justification.  
Under (a) and (b), projectibility is generalist – it extends 
over other contexts, i.e. these contexts that are different 
from the particular context in question where justification is 
to be assured. So the indexical element of providing 
structure in this particular context is avoided. Stress is thus 
put on other contexts, but these contexts are just not 
relevant for the justification in question. The structure of 
justification may only be provided in one specific particular 
context. It is wrong to see defeaters as (additional) 
contexts, as the alternative possibilities (besides to the 
actual one) that need to be checked in order to assure 
knowledge. These possibilities figure as abstract contexts, 
i.e. the contexts abstracted from their actual basis. The 
indexical element needed for justification is missing. So the 
real and actual defeaters have to reside inside a particular 
context – they have to be in the context if the aim is that of 
obtaining justification. So the right structure of justification 
has to be within this context. This is achieved by the 
possibility (c). In (a) and (b) structure of justification follows 
the normative authority of the general – it reaches over to 
contexts that operate outside one particular context in 
question, and it looks at defeaters as being provided by 
alternative contexts. This cannot be the right way to go 
though because defeaters construed as alternative pos-
sible contexts lack indexical elements through which they 
became relevant in the process of securing knowledge. 
2. Justification in context – how does it 
become effective? 
I will fragmentarily use Timmons (1999) as providing a 
position building on general rules with exceptions, thus the 
position under (b) according to the discussion above. 
Because he is appropriating context, his work is of even a 
bigger interest. But there are also differences with what I 
think is a more appropriate position as is the one that he is 
defending. First, his contexts provide a different justifica-
tory landscape if measured by the particularistic shape 
brought into discussion by c). Then, his is a work in moral 
justification and it is not dedicated just to epistemic 
justification per se. The question is what kind of structure 
of justification his proposal establishes. He talks about 
middle level generalizations. But more importantly, he 
appropriates a Rossian generalist and pluralist approach, 
substituting contextually basic parameters to propositions 
instead of Rosses’ assignment of self-evidence status to 
them. 
“There are a number of irreducible moral generalizations 
that are defeasible… In the ordinary context… these are 
often epistemically basic…   
They are contextually basic…  
The contextually basic beliefs provide… the justificatory 
basis for justified belief in other, non-basic moral propo-
sitions…  
Going from basic moral beliefs… to more specific moral 
beliefs about particular cases is not always a matter of 
simply taking the moral generalization together with 
relevant empirical information and deducing a moral 
conclusion. In many cases, two or more morally relevant 
considerations expressed by the basic moral generaliza-
tions will be present in a single case, and for these 
cases we need have no algorithm or ordering system to 
which we can appeal to adjucate the conflict. In these 
cases, moral judgment takes over.” (Timmons 1999, 
214-215) 
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One may use the same strategy that is given here for 
moral epistemology for a story about the structure support-
ing justification. This will then be a typically pluralist story. 
There is certainly a lot around to recommend the struc-
ture of justification according to (b) over the structure of 
justification according to (a). The claim of the alternative 
(b) supporting such flexibility is that the projectibility of the 
general rule prescribing complete or ideal justification has 
to allow for exceptions. Ceteris paribus strategy with 
exceptions is similar to the pluralist strategies in ethics, 
where a domain cannot be arranged just by application of 
one single rule, but by application of several. 
A similar picture would apply to epistemology. You do 
not have just one general rule without exceptions as you 
look for defeaters. You can introduce epistemic responsi-
bility, and you can shape the structure of justification so 
that it fits the desired context. You have to use judgment to 
be a responsible epistemic agent. 
One should not make a mistake here though. The 
proposed strategy is still generalist, for it comes under (b), 
just that it allows for exceptions, and these exceptions 
allow for a possible plurality of principles to be considered 
in order to obtain epistemic justification and knowledge as 
a result.  
The demands of common sense – what may common 
sensically count as knowledge – are much easier satisfied 
by generalities with exception strategy (b) then with the 
exceptionless generalities strategy (a). But it is actually not 
really possible to satisfy accommodation requirements 
determining structure of justification according to the 
strategy (b) if we compare it to the strategy c). The ac-
ceptance of (b) has paved the way for introducing context 
into the epistemic justification story. But the question is 
whether the normative authority determining knowledge 
really is generalist as proposed by (b) or 
 
 
 
 whether it is particularist, as proposed by c). Normative 
authority has to be particularist, i.e. attuned to one indexi-
cally determined context, if knowledge should be the 
desired result. c) is superior to (b). What gives you know-
ledge, if you accept pluralistically minded principle of epis-
temic responsibility, is not the normative authority of the 
general, which requires you to accept the pattern of 
general rule that has the job of checking for all or most of 
logically possible defeaters. What gives you knowledge is 
rather being attuned to this context that authorizes you in 
possessing knowledge.  
Relevance can only come from a particular context, for 
precisely this context provides the normative authority and 
thus the appropriate background landscape determining 
the range of defeaters to be checked in order that 
knowledge is attained. But as the defeaters are in the 
situation, shaping it, the context has to be considered in 
order that one would attain knowledge. The view will be 
judgmental, coming at a glance, not tractable. If defeaters 
are relevant in strategies (a) and (b) they can be indexi-
calized. The strategy c) can then take over the ensuing job 
of justification. 
Literature 
Horgan, T. 2001 “Contextual Semantics and Metaphysical Realism: 
Truth as Indirect Correspondence”, in Lynch, M. (ed.) The Nature 
of Truth, Cambridge: MIT, 67- 95. 
Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. 1996 Connectionism and Philosophy of 
Psychology, Cambridge: MIT. 
Horgan, T, and Potrč, M. 2000 “Blobjectivism and Indirect Corres-
pondence” Facta Philosophica 2, 249-270. 
Potrč, M. 2000 “Justification Having and Morphological Content” 
Acta Analytica 24, 151-173. 
Potrč, M. Unpublished “Beautiful Patterns”. 
Potrč, M. Unpublished “Practical Contexts”. 
Timmons, M. 1999 Morality without Foundations, New York: OUP.  
